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1 INTRODUCTION
The financial crisis has raised a number of legal questions, one of which is
whether or not contracts may be modified or abrogated1 in case of a change
of circumstances.2 The issue is not wholly novel. It has been the subject of
debate ever since medieval times.3 Do all contracts contain an implicit clause
that they are only validwhen the circumstances remain unchanged: the clausula
rebus sic stantibus? European jurisdictions provide different solutions to this
question. But do they in fact diverge where practical issues are concerned?
That is the questionwhich one of the Trento/Torino common core of European
private law working groups has set out to answer. The group’s report was
published last year;4 its main findings are set out below in nrs. 3-9. Before
doing so, this paper purports to give some insight into the group’s method-
ology in nr. 2.
2 THE COMMON CORE OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW PROJECT
TheCommon core of European private law project is based on the combined ideas
of ‘the two Rudi’s’: Rodolfo Sacco and Rudi Schlesinger. Sacco (1923-) is the
godfather of Italian comparative law5 and the author who coined the idea
of ‘legal formants’.6 Having held a chair in Trieste and Pavia, since 1971 he
has been associatedwith the University of Torino. Schlesinger (1909-1996) was
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1 A similar question is whether parties may be obliged to renegotiate the contract. This
question is taken up by Rodrigo Momberg in his contribution to this volume.
2 This paper will use the words ‘change of circumstances’ interchangeably with ‘unexpected
circumstances’.
3 Famous cases include the French Canal de Craponne case (DP 76.1.195, Grand arrêts nr. 94)
and the English coronation cases Krell v Henry, [1903] 2 KB 740 and Herne Bay Steam Boat
v Hutton, [1903] 2 KB 683.
4 Ewoud Hondius, Hans Christoph Grigoleit (eds), Unexpected Circumstances in European
Contract Law, Cambridge: University Press, 2011, 692 p.
5 Witness his Introduzione al diritto comparato (1979) and his I Grandi sistemi giuridici (1996).
6 Rodolfo Sacco, ‘Legal formants: a dynamic approach to comparative law’, 39American Journal
of Comparative Law 1-34 and 343-401 (1991).
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an American of German extraction who taught in Cornell, where he came up
with the theory of the common core of legal systems. According to this theory
jurisdictions may have widely diverging points of departure, but in fact the
outcome of litigation is often the same. Thus, even if specific performance is
the prevailing remedy in continental law, in fact courts will often award
damages, just like in common-law jurisdictions. Schlesinger set out to test his
ideas in a celebrated research project on formation of contract.7 It was in Italy
that the project was to be continued on amuch larger scale. In 1993, two young
(at the time) Professors at the University of Trento, Mauro Bussani and Ugo
Mattei, founded the Common core of European private law project.8 There
were to be three groups, on Contract, Property and Tort. All three are taken
in a very wide sense, including for instance Environmental liability and ecological
damage9 and The enforcement of competition law in Europe.10 The three groups
have annually come together, first in Trento, and then – when the two
convenors continued their careers elsewhere – in Torino. Apart from the
meetings of the three working groups there are also plenary sessions, where
not only general issues are discussed but outsiders are also invited to critically
evaluate the group’s methodology.11 There is open access to the three groups,
which provides a rare chance for young graduates tomingle with old diehards
of comparative law.
It was the Contract group chaired by James Gordley which in 2000 invited
the author of this paper to chair aworking group onChange of circumstances.
The group was to elaborate on the work of an earlier working group on Good
faith, which had included one question on change of circumstances.12 Ten
years later, the work came to fruition. How come the elaboration lasted so
long? Several arguments may be advanced. First, the common core project
has no standardised procedure how to arrive at a questionnaire. Usually it
is the general reporter who submits a draft to e.g. the Contract group. In other
cases, such as in the present project, the questionnaire was arrived at in meet-
ings of the working group, the members of which therefore first had to be
7 Rudi Schlesinger (ed.), Formation of Contracts/A Study of the Common Core of Legal Systems,
Dobbs Ferry: Oceana, 1968, 2 vols., 1 727 p.
8 See among their various publications Mauro Bussani and Ugo Mattei (eds.), Opening up
European law, Bern: Stämpfli, 2007, 283 p.
9 Monika Hinteregger (ed.), Environmental liability and ecological damage, Cambridge:
University Press, 2008, 697 p.
10 Thomas Möllers and Andreas Heinemann (eds.), The Enforcement of Competition Law in
Europe, Cambridge: University Press, 2008, 713 p.
11 See for instance Günter Frankenberg, How to do projects with comparative law – notes
of an expedition to the common core, 6 Global Jurist 2006, issue 2 (this critical appraisal
of the Trento group at the time highly annoyed some of the project’s staunch supporters
such as James Gordley).
12 Reinhard Zimmermann and Simon Whittaker (eds.), Good Faith in European Contract Law,
Cambridge: University Press, 2000, pp. 557-577.
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appointed.13 Also, a second general reporter, Hans Christoph Grigoleit,
presently from the University of Munich, was proposed and accepted. All of
this took time: democracy has its price. Second, the project itself provided no
incentive to establish sharp deadlines; on the contrary, why finish a project
which each year invites its participants to a conference in a wonderful Italian
city, with a precious mix of old established comparative lawyers and fresh
graduates, East and West, practitioners and academics. Third, within this
working group policy-oriented issues – and more particularly the question
whether they should be taken up at all – took up quite some discussion time.
Should the group remain neutral vis-à-vis the aversion of some jurisdictions
to at least providing for the opportunity to open up contracts? As opposed
tomost other projects, the Trento Common core of European private law team
does not have any (outright) political programme, such as harmonisation of
private law. Instead, it focuses on one central issue. This is the contention of
Rudolf Schlesinger that much as the various jurisdictions may differ from one
another when it comes to the starting point, the end results are often the same
or at least very similar.
Fourth, as the readers of Perlmanns Schweigen14 will know, the obligation
to render a manuscript can become problematic. What to do when an author
ignores the deadline set by the group? This depends on the Chapter. It may
well be conceivable to have a comparative studywithout Denmark or Finland,
without theNetherlands or Portugal. Such jurisdictionsmay be left out without
causing major problems to the project as a whole. But a project without Eng-
land and France? That is precisely what threatened in the case of the change
of circumstances project. When the original English and French reporters had
to resign, it had to be decided to look for stand-ins. We were fortunate to get
the help of Denis Philippe, who not only contributed the missing chapter on
his native Belgium, but also that on French law (which actually is very close
to Belgian law). English law also happens to be close to a jurisdiction for which
we fortunately did have a report, namely Ireland. Like their Belgian counter-
part, the Irish reporters undertook to write the national report on English law,
whichwas familiar to them because it provided the foundation of Irish contract
law.
The last element which caused some delay was the production process.
First, the publisher had to decide whether or not to publish the work at all.
We were quite unaware that at Cambridge University Press this decision is
a collective one taken by ‘the Syndicates of the Press’, all, we understand,
13 In the end Odavia Bueno Diaz, Marta Cenini, Robert Clark, Júlio Gomes, Carsten Herresthal,
Cliona Kelly, Bert Lehrberg, Barbara Luppi, Brigitta Lurger, Francesco Macario, Laura
Macgregor, Luz Martínez Velencoso, Valentinas Mikelenas, Kim Oestergaard, Francesco
Parisi, Denis Philippe, Antonio Pinto Monteiro, Andreas Thier, Raphael Thunhart, Luboš
Tichý, Matjaž Tratnik, Anastassios Valtoudis andWillemWiggers participated in the final
text.
14 Pascal Mercier, Perlmanns Schweigen, München: Knaus, 1995.
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academics affiliated with Cambridge University. Then, the manuscript had
to be adapted to the publisher’s guidelines. Finally the text was handed over
to a copy editor, who – it must be said – did a splendid job, once again,
however, at the cost of time.
Apart from the time element involved in team work, several other of the
group’s experiences could be analysed. The selection of cases for the question-
nairewas of course of primary importance. The change of circumstances group,
as opposed to some other groups, tried to be as concise as possible, which
resulted in leaving out some specific contracts. This was also the reason why,
unlike our original plans, we did not include chapters on American law,
administrative law and (public) international law as some other volumes –
we did, however, include chapters on legal history and law& economics. Other
issues which had to be solved were to what extent the solutions to the cases
should be preceded by general descriptions of the various national jurisdictions
and the questionwhich general notions, whichmay also provide relief, should
be covered. Notions such as abus de droit, force majeure, good faith, impossibility,
interpretation, mistake, unfair contract terms and unjust enrichment may
indeed be of relevance.
3 ‘OPEN’ VERSUS ‘CLOSED’ LEGAL SYSTEMS15
Now coming to the substance of the matter, during the research, the group
drew a distinction between ‘open’ and ‘closed’ legal systems. The distinction
is based on the criterion whether or not a jurisdiction recognizes a general
rule under which the contract can be adjusted to unexpected circumstances
by the courts. The distinction led to the following groups: as ‘open’ legal
systems we qualified those of Austria, Germany, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, the
Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden.We characterized as ‘closed’ jurisdictions
those of Belgium, Denmark, England, France, Ireland, Scotland and Slovenia.
To a certain extent this distinction goes along with the classic division into
legal families. Not very surprisingly, the common law tradition and the French
influence (‘closed’ jurisdictions) led to similarities in the doctrinal approach
to cases on the one hand, as did the German tradition (‘open’ jurisdictions)
on the other hand.16
However, the distinction between ‘open’ and ‘closed’ jurisdictions did not
survive the test wholly unscathed as far as the outcome of our cases is con-
cerned. Thus, the distinction between ‘open’ and ‘closed’ jurisdictions is a
15 The following is to a large extent based on the book Unexpected circumstances in European
contract law, referred to above.
16 Rodrigo Momberg in his PhD thesis The Effect of a Change of Circumstances on the Binding
Force of Contracts (PhD thesis Utrecht 2011, Antwerpen: Intersentia, 2011) arrives at a similar
distinction between ‘receptive’ and ‘non-receptive’ systems.
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rough doctrinal approach rather than a clear indication of differences with
regard to the result of a certain case. It is fair to say that the recognition of
a general and flexible rule providing for relief in cases of unexpected circum-
stances may make it easier for the courts to set aside a contract. Yet, the strict
requirements for relief and the variety of other legal concepts dilute the effects
of any particular doctrine. In a jurisdiction such as the Netherlands, for
example, where a provision in the Civil Code allows adjustment of the contract
in case of a change of circumstances, this provision is used so rarely that one
may occasionally ask whether this is not rather a ‘closed’ system. Likewise,
Slovenia, which we qualified as a ‘closed’ jurisdiction, seems to be on the
borderline with the ‘open’ systems. The distinction was drawn based on
doctrinal aspects and the differences between the two groups remain on a
doctrinal level.
This rather diffuse picture with regard to results in the ‘open’ and ‘closed’
legal systems can be explained by the complex interference of different legal
concepts that are applied to cases involving unexpected circumstances. Even
if a jurisdiction does not recognise an ‘exceptional’ doctrine allowing for an
adjustment of the contract, ‘conventional’ doctrines may be appliedwith similar
results. In addition, in many jurisdictions specific legislation exists that is
directed at dealing with the consequences of certain exceptional events on the
contractual exchange. This complex interference of concepts complicates
conclusions on a general level and makes a clear distinction between the
groups difficult as far as the results are concerned.
Yet, it seems fair to say that the recognition of a general and flexible rule
providing for relief in cases of unexpected circumstances may make it easier
for the courts to set aside a contract. Across all the cases, the ‘open’ juris-
dictions actually seem to be more open towards equitable relief than the
‘closed’ ones, while the latter systems express a higher esteem for the principle
of pacta sunt servanda. It is also interesting to see that this division corresponds
remarkably with the distinction between fault liability (‘open’ jurisdictions)
and strict liability (‘closed’ jurisdictions17).
4 CONVERGENCE AS TO THE GENERAL ISSUE OF THE BINDING CHARACTER
OF THE CONTRACT TERMS
Before I turn to a more systematic analysis of the doctrinal concepts, it is
remarkable to observe that in most cases there is a clear tendency as far as
the results are concerned, i.e. whether or not a certain unexpected event
justifies suspending the binding character of the terms of contract and to limit
the principle of pacta sunt servanda. It should be noted, however, that these
17 See case 14 below.
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tendencies only relate to the suspensory effect as such while the legal con-
sequences (adjustment or termination) may vary in detail. I shall examine these
tendencies in the four different groups that we have established for our cases:
a) Equivalence of exchange is substantially affected
1) With regard to the first group of cases in which the ‘equivalence of the
exchange has been affected’ we can conclude that under the law of all juris-
dictions long-term agreements can lose their binding effect if, in the course
of time, the initially fixed price grows out of proportion to the value of the
object.18 In many jurisdictions, the right to terminate long-term contracts is
an essential element of their contract law. Such a right is, in effect, based on
the rationale that in the course of long-term agreements unexpected effects
can occur that cannot be provided for by the parties in advance. This cor-
respondence becomes evident under the German rules on unexpected circum-
stances which contain a separate section dealingwith the effects of unexpected
events on long-term contracts (§ 314 BGB) besides the general provision on
Störung der Geschäftsgrundlage (§ 313 BGB).
2) There is generally much reservation as to the question whether extra-
ordinary inflation can affect credit agreements. Only some of the ‘open’ juris-
dictions mitigate the consequences for the burdened party while applying very
strict standards.19 This reservation can be referred to the nominal value prin-
ciple under which the amount of a monetary debt is based on its nominal and
not on its ‘real’ value. Inflation is a ubiquitous phenomenon of the economy
and distinctions between regular and excessive conditions are hard to draw.
18 Case 1 ‘Canal de Craponne’: Long-term agreement – devaluation of the price agreement.
Early in the 20th century, the farmers A and B entered into a contract under which A
promised to build and maintain an irrigation channel; B was entitled to extract water at
a fixed price. The contract was concluded for an unlimited period of time. Almost 100 years
later, A’s successors ask for an increase in the price arguing that due to inflation and a
rise in the cost of maintenance as well as labour the agreed price has become completely
inadequate.
Is the claim by A’s successors justified? Are they, alternatively, entitled to terminate the
contract?
19 Case 2 Extraordinary inflation:Hardship due to extraordinary inflation; hardship resulting from
a foreign currency agreement (Extraordinary inflation).
A receives a loan from the B-Bank. Under the agreement, the interest rate is fixed at 10
percent for five years. In the last 20 years before the agreement, the rate of inflation had
been relatively stable within a range of one to six percent. In the third year after the
conclusion of the agreement, the economic situation begins to destabilize and inflation rises
quickly to 50 percent.
Ewoud Hondius 121
Unsurprisingly, due to its speculative nature, the jurisdictions are even more
reluctant to grant relief in the case of a foreign currency agreement.20
3) We can observe a tendency towards relief in cases, in which government
intervention has strongly affected the contractual equilibrium, even though
the ‘closed’ jurisdictions are more reluctant to grant relief. This trend can be
attributed to the consideration that government action is often elementary to
the parties’ interests and evidently beyond their control.
4) Under a majority of jurisdictions, unexpected benefits do not trigger any
form of relief, even if the benefits are out of proportion with the considera-
tion.21 It appears that one-sided windfall profits arising from the contract
do not elicit the same inclination for equitable compensation as excessive losses.
b) Recipient’s use of goods or services is substantially affected
1) In the cases from group B where the ‘recipient’s use of goods or services
is substantially affected’, government intervention seems to be, again, a clear
example for judicial intervention: relief is predominantly granted if the lease
of a petrol station becomes worthless to the lessee as petrol is no more avail-
able due to confiscation in wartime.22 However, in the majority of the juris-
dictions an export ban that is already present at the time of contracting does
not justify relief for the burdened party even if both parties expected that the
20 Case 2B: B-Bank asks for an adjustment or for a termination of the contract (Variation: foreign
currency agreement).
The loan agreement between A and the B-Bank provides for repayment and interest in
a foreign currency. In the last 10 years before the agreement, the relevant exchange rate
had been relatively stable within a range of 20 percent. Subsequently, the national currency
is devaluated by 80 percent compared to the foreign currency.
A asks for an adjustment or for a termination of the contract.
21 Case 4 Unexpected benefit: Long-term lease – extraordinary increase of the rental value
B leases business premises from A for a fixed period of 15 years. Shortly after concluding
the contract, the character of the area changes strongly and unexpectedly: Amilitary airport
located nearby is shut down and an enormous amount of public funds is invested in the
area (infrastructure etc.). As a consequence, B´s business soars and his profits are 500%
of what he could reasonably have expected. By the same token, the rental value of compar-
able business premises in the same area rises to 500% of the amount A and B have agreed
upon. A claims that the leasing price is to be adjusted accordingly or, alternatively, that
the agreement is to be terminated.
Is A’s claim justified?
22 Case 6 Confiscation of petrol: Government intervention makes the use of a rented petrol station
impossible
A leases a petrol station from B. Due to the outbreak of war, the government confiscates
all petrol in that area and it is impossible for A to obtain petrol from any source. As a result,
A can make no use of the petrol station. He stops the payment on the lease.
Is A’s refusal to pay the rent justified?
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ban would be suspended.23 The reason for upholding the contract in this case
is that the parties knew about the risk of the ban and the misjudgement of
an identified risk is held not to justify a relief.
2) When a promised work of construction (in our case: a cellar) becomes
useless to the client due to a natural disaster (destruction of the rest of the
building), all legal systems give him the right to cancel the completion of the
work because it has become useless.With regard to the question of compensa-
tion, the jurisdictions are basically divided into two groups: according to one
approach, the contractor remains entitled to the full contract price less the
expenses he saves by not having to carry out the work, e.g. wages, material
etc (Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, France and Slovenia). Thereby the
contractor is awarded his contractual profits and the risk that the contract has
become useless is allocated to the client. The argument for this is that the house
is in his sphere of risk and control. In other jurisdictions, the contractor’s claim
for his contractual profits is reduced by some form of equitable adjustment
and therefore the risk is distributed between both parties (e.g. Germany, the
Netherlands, Portugal, England and Ireland). This solution is based upon the
notion that the risk in question is not rooted in the house itself but in the
natural disaster which is beyond either party’s control.24
23 Case 10 Export ban: Purchaser of technical equipment is affected by export ban
FirmA purchases technical equipment which is to be produced by firm B. The parties know
that firm A plans to resell the equipment to Iraq. At the time of contracting, exports to
Iraq are illegal but the parties expect that the status quo will change before the time of
delivery. The parties are aware that the equipment can only be sold to Iraq at a reasonable
price. When firm B has completed production and offers delivery, exports to Iraq are still
illegal and no change is in sight. Firm A refuses acceptance and payment.
Is A’s refusal to accept and pay justified?
24 Case 5 Destruction of cellar: Renovation of cellar becomes useless due to the destruction of the
building by a natural disaster
A agrees to refurbish B’s cellar into a wine cellar. The work is scheduled to start one month
after the agreement. Before the work has started, B’s house is completely destroyed during
a violent summer storm. However, the cellar of the house remains fully intact. B immediate-
ly informs A and asks him not to perform. A insists on the agreement. He argues that B’s
cellar is still intact, that he has reserved two weeks to carry out the work and that he has
already purchased the necessary materials.
Is B obliged to pay the contract price or, alternatively, to compensate A for his losses?
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3) In the hotel reservation case the four events presented25 display different
tendencies: there is broad correspondence with regard to the conclusion that
the frustration of individual purposes (exhibition cancelled26) and disturbances
in transport (strike27) do not relieve the customer from his contractual obliga-
tions as these risks fall in the sphere of the customer. There is a certain
tendency towards relief in the case involving terrorist threats;28 however,
much seems to depend on the facts (e.g. the probability and the foreseeability
of the attacks). A clear tendency for relief can be stated in the coronation case:
the fact that the price reflects the procession leads most reports to conclude
that the hotel owner has to bear the risk.29
4) With regard to the shop rental case, a clear majority of the jurisdictions
denies relief to the shop owner who claims that the business environment has
developed unfavourably. This risk is considered not to be unusual and there-
fore the shop owner could and should have provided for it by implementing
a protective term.30 The jurisdictions under scrutiny are more likely to grant
relief, however, if the owner of a bar is bound under a long-term supply
agreement to sell only one kind of beer and this beer turns out to be unpopular
among the guests.31 Here, the long-term character of the contract may
25 Case 7 Hotel reservation: Individual purpose of the visit frustrated; strike by airport personnel;
general safety endangered; coronation case
A booked a room at B’s hotel, but:
a) The exhibition he wants to visit is cancelled at the very last moment.
b) A terrorist movement declares that it is to launch a campaign against tourists in that
town.
c) An unforeseeable strike by airport personnel prevents A from travelling to the city where
the hotel is located at the specified time.
d) The coronation procession scheduled on the respective date is cancelled. The room has
a view of the street where the procession was supposed to take place. Due to the extra-
ordinary event, the agreed price is ten times higher than the regular price.
Is A entitled to cancel the reservation?
26 Case 7 (a).
27 Case 7 (c).
28 Case 7 (b).
29 Case 7 (d).
30 Case 8 Shop rental: Renting a retail outlet; unexpected business environment at a shopping centre
A is the owner of a bookshop. He contracts with B to rent business accommodation in B’s
shopping centre. The fixed period of the lease is 5 years. The shopping centre has just been
built and a large part of the accommodation is still unoccupied. Both parties expect at the
time of contracting that a variety of shops (the hotel and catering trade, retail sales) will
be located there. One year later almost all the accommodation is rented, but ¾ of the
shopping centre consists of restaurants and cafes. For that reasonmost potential customers
visit the shopping centre after A closes the doors of his bookshop.
Is A entitled to an adjustment or to a termination of the contract?
31 Case 9 Beer supply agreement: Long-term supply of beer; beer sales are far below expectations
A, the owner of a bar, enters into an exclusive supply agreement with beer brewery B for
a fixed period of 15 years. Pursuant to the contract, A is obliged to accept and pay for a
specific quantity of beer on amonthly basis, while he is allowed to use technical equipment
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strengthen the case for relief as well as the fact that the risk in question (the
popularity of the beer) might be qualified as falling within the sphere of the
brewery.
c) Failure of a specified purpose (other than a) and b))
Both of the cases that were dealt with under the heading ‘specified purposes’
show a tendency in favour of relief:
1) The assumption that the sold property will be used for cultural purposes
will suffice for setting aside the agreement if it is used for other purposes
because this assumption is – similarly to the coronation case – reflected in the
price.32 Here, the requirements of equity can quite easily be reconciled with
the principle of pacta sunt servanda on the basis of ‘conventional’ doctrines
(especially constructive interpretation).
2) In the case of divorce, the investment of one spouse in the property of the
other one can give rise to a claim for compensation in most jurisdictions if
divorce law does not provide for just results.33 This solution can be based
on the consideration that the reliance on the durability of the marriage should
be legally protected.
and furnishings owned by B. The consumption of beer, however, remains far below expecta-
tions. The bar is well attended but the ‘B beer’ is unpopular amongst customers at A’s bar.
A requests an adjustment or the termination of the agreement.
Is A’s claim justified?
32 Case 11 Sale of real estate involving expectation of cultural use:Use of real estate by transferee
does not comply with expectations of the transferor
A sells his family home to B at a price far below its market value. Both parties assume
that B would dedicate the house to cultural purposes only. However, this assumption was
not inserted in the contract as an explicit condition. B changes his mind and gives it to
one of his daughters instead.
Is A entitled to ask for the difference between the agreed price and the market value or,
alternatively, to reclaim the house?
33 Case 12 Investment in spouse’s house is frustrated by divorce: Equitable compensation if
divorce laws lack a basis for compensation. Before A and B marry, they enter into a prenuptial
agreement, inwhich they agree on the separation of property. During themarriageA buys a
house and A and B use the house as their family home. The price of the house is C= 500,000.
A is the sole proprietor of the house, but B has contributed C= 100,000 to the purchase price.
In addition, B carries out extensive renovation work before they move in. The renovation
would have cost C= 50,000 if professional services had been employed. After A and B have
lived together in the house for one year, they separate and then divorce. Divorce law does
not provide a basis for compensation.
Is B entitled to compensation for his contributions to the family home?
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d) Mutual mistake and miscellaneous issues
1) A clear tendency can be stated in the case in which the parties of a share
deal were mutually mistaken concerning the market value of shares.34 Here,
the burdened party is generally entitled to set aside the agreement on the fixed
price, as both parties share the responsibility for themistake. Another tendency
is that the party burdened by the false price fixing is not entitled to enforce
a price agreement that reflects the ‘true value’ because the other party’s reliance
on the written price agreement must equally be taken into account. Notable
exceptions are the common-law jurisdictions of England and Ireland where
no remedy is granted and thereby the risk of the mutual mistake is allocated
only to the party burdened by the ‘false’ price calculation in the written
contract.
2) In Case 14,35 the effect of unexpected circumstances on the respective rules
on breach of contract was analysed. The question here is whether the seller
would be excused from his liability in damages due to the unexpected nature
of the impediment. Even though many jurisdictions tend to solve this case
on the basis of their (‘conventional’) doctrines on breach of contract, a clear
distinction between the ‘open’ and ‘closed’ jurisdictions can be observed. The
main reason for this is that the distinction between the ‘open’ and the ‘closed’
jurisdictions is in line with the division between systems that apply a fault
liability regime with regard to contractual damages and those jurisdictions
that provide for strict liability. On the basis of their strict liability regime, there
is a clear tendency to holding A liable for damages among the ‘closed’ juris-
dictions. The findings of the ‘open’ jurisdictions remain somewhat vague due
to the limited factual basis of the given case. However, it becomes quite clear
that, subject to the factual details of the case, A has strong arguments to
challenge his liability in many of the ‘open’ jurisdictions. The lack of a clear
34 Case 13 Share deal – mutual mistake: False determination of the market value in a share deal.
A holds shares of X corporation. He agrees to sell the shares to B at the current price as
listed by the stock exchange on the day of contracting. In the written contract, the parties
set a price of C= 10 per share. However, the actual price per share on the day of contracting
is C= 12. The Internet service from which the parties derived the price had displayed an
incorrect number. When A discovers the correct price, he demands that the purchase price
be increased to C= 12. CanA ask for a price of C= 12 per share? Can he, alternatively, terminate
the contract?
35 Case 14 Impediments of production beyond seller’s control: Production of contractual goods
is inhibited by a strike/ restriction of electricity supplies
A agrees to deliver some goods to B on a certain date, but:
a) The workers of a subcontractor go on strike.
b) Due to problems with the State energy production and distribution system the Govern-
ment decides to cut the electricity supply at night thereby making it impossible to work
at night.
As a result, A cannot deliver the goods for an uncertain period of time.
Is B entitled to terminate the contract and to ask for damages?
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tendency reflects the division as to the liability regime, but also the ambi-
valence of the risks in question. While neither strikes nor the energy supply
are under the complete control of the seller, one may argue that he is closer
to these sources of risk than the purchaser.
3) With regard to Case 15,36 it is remarkable to note that a general disclaimer
will predominantly be regarded as invalid in both the ‘open’ and in the ‘closed’
jurisdictions. There are, however, some exceptions (Belgium and France from
the group of the ‘closed’ and Germany, Portugal and Spain from the group
of the ‘open’ jurisdictions). The rationale for the majority perspective is that
unexpected events are beyond the parties’ imagination and thus beyond their
dispositions. Onemay also draw the conclusion that the equity principles from
which the doctrines governing unexpected circumstances are derived are
qualified as ius cogens.
5 THE PREFERENCE FOR OPENLY ADDRESSING THE ISSUE
Let us now turn to the doctrinal distinction between ‘conventional’ and ‘ex-
ceptional’ concepts. The doctrines that specifically address the issue of un-
expected circumstances and identify the unexpected event as the source for
relief (e.g.Wegfall der Geschäftsgrundlage, doctrine of assumptions, clausula rebus
sic stantibus) have been referred to as ‘exceptional’ doctrines. ‘Conventional’
doctrines, on the other hand, are the traditional doctrines of contract law,
which are based on the parties’ (hypothetical) intentions or on flaws in the
mechanism of contracting. Such doctrines can address unexpected events with
reference to the contractual agreement (e.g. interpretation,mistake, impossibil-
ity of performance and laesio enormis;
In favour of the ‘conventional’ concepts one may argue that they are in
harmonywith the principle of pacta sunt servanda: if the parties’ (hypothetical)
intentions can be referred to as the basis of relief or if flaws can be identified
in the contracting process, there is no conflict between the contract and an
equitable allocation of risks. The harmonising character of the ‘conventional’
concepts may make it easier for the courts to set the contract aside.
36 Case 15 Disclaimer:Disclaimer concerning the rights arising from unexpected circumstances; other
clauses related to unexpected circumstances
The construction company A agrees to build a double-floor building on B’s land for the
price of C= 2,000,000. In the contract the parties stipulate a disclaimer which excludes ‘all
the rights of both parties arising from unexpected circumstances’. Two weeks after the
construction work has begun a granite rock, which could not have been detected by the
parties before the conclusion of the contract, is revealed on B’s land. As a result the costs
of the construction increase by 300 %.
Can A ask for an adjustment of the contract or can he terminate the contract in spite of
the disclaimer?
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However, quite often the ‘conventional’ concepts provide no precise and
persuasive rationale for relief in cases of unexpected circumstances – even if
they are referred to by the courts. If the contract does not address the un-
expected event explicitly or by clear implication, relief cannot be based on
the parties’ actual intentions. Hence, ‘conventional’ concepts are always dealing
with hypothetical assumptions as to what the parties would have agreed upon
if they had foreseen the event. This reconstruction of the parties’ hypothetical
intentions will often be fictional. If the parties have not foreseen the risk in
question, it is equally fictional to qualify their non-perception as a mistake.
Therefore, in many cases of unexpected circumstances the application of a
‘conventional’ doctrine amounts to concealing the essential equitable conflict
between the (flawless but silent) contract and the extrinsic effect caused by
the unexpected event in question.
The ‘exceptional’ doctrines, on the other hand, openly address the conflict
between the contract and the requirements of equity in the light of the un-
expected event in question. These doctrines and their application reveal that
inmost cases the problem of unexpected circumstances cannot be solvedwith
reference to the intention of the parties and that an external standard of law
is to be applied in the assessment of the event and its consequences for the
contract. This becomes evident in the ‘open’ jurisdictions, where on the basis
of a general ‘exceptional’ doctrine the contractual agreement itself can be
adjusted to match the requirements of equity.
The European model rules on contract law presented so far all propose
to recognize such a general ‘exceptional’ doctrine. The conflict between the
principle of pacta sunt servanda and the requirements of equity is particularly
evident in the rules of the DCFR (Draft Common Frame of Reference), which
are based on the PECL (Principles of European Contract Law). In Art. III.-1:110
DCFR and Art. 6.111 PECL the principle of sanctity of the contract is confirmed
as the general rule. However, at the same time, it is confronted with the
relevant exceptions in the case of a change of circumstances.
6 MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS FOR SETTING ASIDE THE CONTRACT
As I have already mentioned and as the national reports illustrate there are
various ‘exceptional’ doctrines, i.e. concepts specifically addressing the issue
of unexpected circumstances both in the ‘open’ and in the ‘closed’ jurisdictions.
In the ‘open’ jurisdictions, these doctrines will allow for termination as well
as adjustment of the contract, while in the ‘closed’ jurisdictions termination
is generally the only remedy available.
Even though the different concepts vary strongly in detail, we can identify
three basic prerequisites for the application of such ‘exceptional’ doctrines,
as far as their doctrinal justification is concerned:
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1) The transaction must have been affected fundamentally by a certain event.
This requirement expresses the general idea that the principle of pacta sunt
servanda and the stability of the contract may only be disregarded in ex-
ceptional cases.
2) The event affecting the transaction must not have been provided for in the
contract or foreseen by both parties at the time of the conclusion of the contract.
This requirement reflects the prevalence of the parties’ specific dispositions
within the scope of their foresight.
3) The burden resulting from the event may not be attributed to one party by
any particular legal rule. This postulate accounts for the principle of lex specialis
derogat legi generali: the law provides rules for certain unexpected events and
these rules demand priority over a general doctrine on unexpected circum-
stances.
These requirements can be characterized as ‘minimum conditions’: even though
further restrictions may (and often do) apply under the law of the individual
jurisdictions, these requirements must be met in any case if the contract is to
be challenged successfully.
Evidently, the ‘minimum conditions’ are phrased in general and ambiguous
terms and they cannot guarantee convergence with regard to the findings in
a certain case, as the complementary rules vary throughout the jurisdictions.
But this ambiguity and divergence often reflect the ambiguous and manifold
character of the problem of unexpected circumstances rather than diverging
concepts in the different legal systems which admittedly exist as well. Even
if the complementary rules were identical, the question of what amounts to
a ‘fundamental effect’ or which contractual risks are provided for in the
agreement or by a particular rule of law is largely based on the individual
appreciation of the event in question. The fundamental conflict between legal
security and the binding force of contract on the one hand and equity on the
other hand will always leave room for diverging judgements.
7 DISTINCTION BETWEEN ISSUES OF INITIAL MISTAKE AND OF UNEXPECTED
EVENTS ARISING AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF THE CONTRACT
A mistake of one party or a mutual mistake of both parties with regard to
factors that were already present before or at the time the contract was con-
cluded differs significantly from the occurrence of unexpected events arising
after the conclusion of the contract. A clear distinction between pre-existing
and supervening factors is meaningful for the doctrinal treatment of un-
expected circumstances, because it is generally easier for the parties to recog-
nize and control pre-existing factors than future developments. Furthermore,
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by submitting themselves to a contractual agreement, the parties are aware
that they generally assume the risk of future changes and they may only be
relieved from this risk under exceptional circumstances. A lack of information
about pre-existing factors, on the other hand, will in most jurisdictions allow
parties to terminate a contract even if they are not heavily burdened by the
contract. The absence of a relevant mistake is a precondition for the binding
effect of the contract and the assumption of risks provided therein. Hence,
if a party is mistaken about certain factors that were present at the time of
contracting, the case should only be treated according to the respective rules
on mistake.
If some jurisdictions tend to apply their ‘exceptional’ doctrines on un-
expected circumstances in cases of mistakes as to pre-existing factors, this can
mainly be explainedwith certain deficiencies in their respective law of mistake.
Germany,where the rules onGeschäftsgrundlage are applied in cases ofmutual
mistakes, may serve as an example because the rules on mistake in the BGB
were only designed for cases of one-sided responsibility for the mistake and
the principles on Geschäftsgrundlage offer a more flexible instrument that is
necessary in cases of mutual mistake. From a doctrinal point of view, these
problems can be solved more adequately by refining the rules on mistake.
However, the fact that the problem of initial mistake and the issue of
supervening unexpected circumstances both tend to be approached on the
same doctrinal basis shows that they are in fact similar with regard to the issue
of remedies. In both types of cases, the binding force of the agreement is
disregarded because one or both parties have failed to take into account certain
factors that were of relevance for the contract. And both cases can essentially
be solved with two remedies: the contract can either be discharged or it can
be adjusted to take into account the relevant aspect. A legal system therefore
has to answer this question with regard to both constellations discussed. It
is suggested that, in a rational legal system with a systematic approach, both
problems should be addressed in the same way.
8 LEGAL CONSEQUENCES – THE UNSOLVED MYSTERY OF ‘ADJUSTMENT’
The convergences of the court findings (see under 2) and the similarities in
the doctrinal approach (see under 4) only concern the primary issue whether
or not the contract is suspended due to unexpected circumstances. With regard
to the secondary issue, i.e. the precise definition of the legal consequences,
it is very hard to identify convergence between the different jurisdictions. Upon
a closer look, this obscurity is not due to the comparative perspective; rather,
the cause for this can be traced back to the legal systems themselves, neither
of which presents a clear, systematic, complete and convincing concept with
regard to the legal consequences that apply once an unexpected event suspends
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the binding effect of the contract terms. The same holds true for the various
European model codes of contract law.
The remedy of termination is quite simple and does not involve much
judicial discretion. It is not surprising that this remedy is widely available in
cases of unexpected circumstances in all jurisdictions. However, in a large
number of cases termination does not achieve fair results, as it may distribute
the losses arising from the unexpected event arbitrarily to one party. Therefore,
it can be said that the recognition of a mechanism of adjustment is a postulate
of equity if the contact is set aside due to unexpected circumstances.
This conclusion is explicitly drawn in the ‘open’ jurisdictions and in the
model codes (e.g. Art. III. – 1:110 DCFR; Art. 6:111 PECL, Art. 92 Feasibility
study), as there are established sets of rules under which the burdened party
may seek adjustment of the contract in cases of unexpected circumstances.
Even in the ‘closed’ jurisdictions, where there are no such mechanisms estab-
lished as a general rule, the reports show that the courts may find a way to
reach results that amount to adjustment of the contractual terms, e.g. on the
basis of constructive interpretation or by granting ad-hoc compensation based
on the standards of equity and good faith. Also, the development of the
doctrine of frustration in England shows that the all-or-nothing approach of
termination (or discharge) is inadequate for dealing with all the issues of
unexpected circumstances. In England, the strict effects of the common-law
doctrine of frustration leading to a discharge of the contract had to be amended
by an obligation to compensate in the Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act
1943, granting the judge a great extent of discretion in order to achieve just
results.
The details of adjustment, however, involve a number of difficult issues:
1) The relation between termination and adjustment (i.e. the conditions under
which termination or adjustment is the appropriate remedy): this aspect also
includes the questionwhether the party that is not burdened by the unexpected
circumstance in question is entitled to object to the adjustment and can thereby
compel termination.
2) The form of adjustment: it must be determinedwhether the adjustmentmay
interfere with the contractual obligations in kind or whether there is only
monetary compensation available.
3) The standard for determining the extent of adjustment: this issue raises the
difficult question of whether the burdened party has to bear the losses from
the unexpected circumstances up to a reasonable extent or whether – alter-
natively – the losses are to be divided equally among both parties.
4) The technical implementation of adjustment: it must be determined whether
adjustment comes into force by operation of law (determined by the court)
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or whether the burdened party has a right to claim adjustment by specifying
the contents of the adjustment. In addition, it must be decidedwhether adjust-
mentmust be preceded by a renegotiation process andwhether and how such
a renegotiation process can be governed by rules of law.
The reports show that these issues have not yet been fully resolved in any
one of the jurisdictions explored in this volume. Hence, it is unsurprising that
convergent and convincing solutions cannot be identified from the comparative
perspective. It appears that the conditions for adjusting the contract are the
unsolved mystery of the legal rules on unexpected circumstances. This un-
resolved issue is of great influence for the entire problem as the willingness
to grant relief depends very much on reliable consequences of the remedy
available.
In order to provide fair solutions it is unavoidable to recognise a legal
regime for the adjustment of a contract that is affected by relevant unexpected
circumstances. One may resort to judicial discretion which is relied upon by
all of the ‘open’ as well as the ‘closed’ jurisdictions to a certain extent. How-
ever, if more precise guidelines are required, the material is inconclusive. Thus,
the conditions of adjustment appear to be themost important topic for further
research in the field of unexpected circumstances.
9 BY WAY OF CONCLUSION: UNCERTAINTY, THE LACK OF PRECEDENTS AND
HARMONISATION BY ADVANCING THE LEGAL DISCOURSE
Aswasmentioned above, the uncertainty of judgements on unexpected circum-
stances is an unavoidable characteristic of the conflict between legal security
and the binding force of contract on the one hand and the requirements of
equity on the other. There are possibilities for strengthening certainty on the
comparative level by further harmonisation with regard to the doctrinal
background in general and the mechanism of adjustment in particular. Yet,
there is another structural source of uncertainty that is particularly important
in cases of unexpected circumstances. That is the lack of reliable precedents
in many jurisdictions.
Many cases in which relief on the basis of unexpected circumstances is
discussed are quite eccentric and rare. Some national reporters have had
difficulties identifying precedents similar to our cases at hand and some may
have had to go back several decades. Especially in continental countries, the
questionmay be raisedwhether ‘old’ precedents still have – persuasive – value
as they reflect an antiquated legal and social background and could arguably
be overruled if they were submitted to the respective Supreme Court today.37
37 Ewoud Hondius (ed.), Precedent and the law/Les précédents et le droit, Bruxelles: Bruylant,
2007, p. 19.
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Further harmonisation of the law in Europe may enlarge the basis of
precedents. It would mean that instead of a meagre trickle of cases, every
member state would fully profit from the case-law of the other member states
of the European Union. However, the harmonisation on the basis of precedents
does not necessarily depend on a common Civil Code.38 The American
example shows that the various states of the Union refer to the case law of
other states. The process of harmonisation by precedents may be enhanced
by a restatement of European contract law without binding effect. In fact, in
Europe several such restatements are available such as the DCFR, the PECL, the
Principles of the Association Henri Capitant des Amis de la Culture Juridique
Française and the Société de Législation Comparée, the Acquis-Principles, the
Gandolfi Code, the Feasibility study of the European group of experts (art.
92),39 the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the
Council on a Common European Sales Law (art. 89),40 as well as other inter-
national instruments, such as the UNIDROIT Principles for International Com-
mercial Contracts.
We have already seen that there is a considerable amount of similarity
between the different European legal systems both in terms of the results
achieved as well as in terms of their doctrinal approach (cf. 2 and 4). Hence,
even without a uniform mandatory European rule on unexpected circum-
stances, courts and practitioners may profit from an analysis of cases from
other European legal systems. Such an exchange is particularly important in
cases of unexpected circumstances as, due to the variety of the potentially
relevant factors, the legal doctrines applied and their requirements are neces-
sarily vague and as it may always be argued that the solution will greatly
depend on the facts of the individual case. Furthermore, it should be stressed
again that, as far as precise doctrinal guidelines are concerned, no legal systems
seem to have presented an comprehensively convincing approach to the
problem of unexpected circumstances so far. Therefore, the volumeUnexpected
circumstances in European contract law is intended to serve as a guide that may
help to improve the understanding between the different European legal
systems and to refine the rules on unexpected circumstances, either on the
level of the national jurisdiction or with regard to harmonisation projects.
Of course, the process of harmonisation on the basis of precedents involves
the problem of languages. An Estonian case on change of circumstances will
have little impact in Portugal if it is not available in a language which is
accessible to Portuguese lawyers. A database in the present European lingua
38 See Ilka Klöckner, Grenzüberschreitende Bindung an zivilgerichtliche Präjudizien, PhD thesis
Freiburg 2005, Tübingen: Mohr, 2006, 254 p.
39 A European contract law for consumers and businesses: publication of the results of the
feasibility study carried out by the Expert Group on European contract law for stakeholders’
and Legal practitioners’ feedback, May 2011. See Reiner Schulze and Jules Stuyck (eds.),
Towards a European Contract Law – An Introduction, München: Sellier, 2011.
40 COM(2011) 635 final.
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franca – and ideally in more than just one language – would therefore be
necessary. This need not necessarily be a database in the formal sense, such
as the former CLAB.41 A more user-friendly option is ECTIL’s Yearbook of Tort
Law, which is discussed at annual meetings in Vienna.42 Likewise, Torino
could be the platform, long after the Common Core project has finished, for
annual updates as to national case law on the various topics, such as un-
expected circumstances. An alternative would be Vienna, the newly selected
site of the European Law Institute, founded in 2011. But then, why not remain
in Torino?
41 DG SANCO’s one time database on unfair contract terms (clauses abusives) – see Thomas
Wilhelmsson, in: Torbjörn Andersson, Bengt Lindell (eds.), Festskrift till Per Henrik Lindblom,
Stockholm: Iustus, 2004, pp. 781-800.
42 This year’s 10th annual conference was held in Vienna from 28-30 April 2011.

